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2"OTh',R J:O:' ARDY.
---- C ....
I MTTcUCTICI".
That maxim of our law whch -ays "No man shall twice be
put in Jeopardy for the 81ne offence" althot.h of constitut-
ional force in tho United States had its origin in the common
law of England. The earliest English authority for this
naxin, is Lord Coke. In his Institutes. (3 Inst.11.0) we find
it laid down as follows *If any person be indicted of treason
or felony or Iareeny and ':cad not guilty and theruloln a
Jury, is returned and sworn the verdict nu1st be heard and they
cannot be discharged neither can the jurors in those cases
give a p, rivy verdict but ought to give their verdict openly
In eo:rt. There has boon rntch ariticism it on this proposit-
ion as we find it here laid down by Coke. It has been crit-
icised that it is too broad in its terms, that it is a mere
diatim and is not sujyortod by any judicial decision made
previous to that time. It 'as however been cited as an
authority in a long line of English oases in which the ques-
tion ofS second p;rosecution was involved. Lord Hale, an
anthority of the first eminence in 2 Pleas of the Crown 294,
makes the following rtatement. "By the ancient law if the
Jnry sworn had been once :.PrticuLarly eheT? Tith the pirson-
ad it was ocoionly held they t give iw . their :erdict and
they could not be discharged before verdict rar Civcnml. But
said be "The contrary course her for a long tire obtained and
notiing is irore ordinary than after tho jury w.orn and charged
with ML prson and the verdict given.t if it appoars to the
court that some of the ovidene is kept back, or taken off or
that there nay be a fuller discovery and tho offense notor-
ious as murder or burglary and that the evidence though not
saffielent to convict the prisoner yet giver the court a
great and strong suspiicon of his guilt the court may din-
charge the 3ury of the prisoner and remit him to the jail for
further evidence; for otherwise many notorious murders or
bivrglaries may pass unpunished by the acquittal of a persn
probably guilty when the full evidence is not searched out or
given." Hale after pointing out the ap;-;arent inaccuracy of
Coke's statement proceeds to show that the practice of dis-
charging Juries in the discretion of the court was in his day
greatly narrowed down. Thi he attritutes tc a reform at-
tempted by the Judges themselves ".en the n.ractice caae to be
perverted from its original lprpose of securing a fair trial
to subserve the ends of prosecutors in jolitical trials. The
judges without any decition 3r p-recodent, he says upon con-
sultation wiong themselves laiR, "orn the rule that the Jur=y
should not be discharged in criminal cases in te discretion
of the 3udge.
A case which illustrates tbe atuse of this privilege for
suoh political -rTposes is the lrial of two Jemit iriests
who were charged with complicity in tie Po.ish plot reported
in 2 State Trials 710, 327. In this case '1aitebeard, a
Jesuit was Lut upon trial and after he was given over to the
j ry fudge Scroggs on hearing that eleven j3Urors favored his
acquittal and only one stood for his conviction, i:i:ediately
and for no other reason discharged the jury and remamded the
prisoner to jail to Pwait nother trial for his life; and he
was subsequently triedconvieted and ',ut to doath. This ease
has been neverely criticised and the extrenci to which the
Judge carried his 1rerogative har sought justification on the
ground that it tooh jlace at r turbiAlent jieriod in English
history. This is admissible to a l14;ited extent as the
Judge who sat at the trial is far froa being above reproach
bnt recent authorities sear to think it 'as in line rith the
spirit of the ti-nes 1 n. D. D.
En exear nation of tho origingir. V t volution of this
maxim so far, leads us to buliove that it was at first a hard
and fast rule from rhich the courts were not rdlo..:o to de-
part; that under no circimstances could a jury be discharged
and the defendent again brought to trial. GoiCg then to the
other extreme a d allowing alrost absolute discretion to the
Judges, it soon ripened into a license and abuse for which
the judges were compelled to find a remedy. This brought
abcut a reform and again the r;xift ts asserted al1nost as
broadly as was originally laid down by Coke.
The next important decision is that of R v Gould, Mich.T.
4 Gee. III. The defendant ras indicted fIor murder. The
jury was sworn and b ;r T thb evidenbe' whs in when one of
the JITrors was taken ill and left court and presently died.
The Jury was discharged and the prisoner sent back to jail.
On a writ of habeas corpus brought to have the defendant re-
leased the court with a full bench of judges decided that he
could be put en trial at the assize, or the Judge might have
ordered a new Jun7 sworn irzediately and could have proceeded
with the trial. This holdig was distinctly enunciated and
followed in the case of Anna Salbert, 2 Ieaeh 320(1734)
In 3lackstane's aoint.entaries (4 31. 5o. 3S51 we find
the rule laid down in this modified laretage, " J~iries cannot
be dishared except in cases of evident neceossity before
they give a vediat.r
After the adotition of tho Tohlural Constitution and Con-
gress had recommended several nen.rents for the better pro-
teaticn of the rights of the T-eo1-le this fifth one which was
adopted read as follaws; "hNor thpl Pny pevsor be nubJect for
the samwe offense to be twice put in Jeopardy of lifo or limb*.
Now whether thin provision ara, iontonded3c to be declaratory or
the common law merely so as to be litited in its application
ta a case where the defendant hae been prasecuted and acquit-
ted or convicted by the verdict of a jury is a question on
which we will find a great conflict has ensued among the
conrts of this country.
Blackstone says the pleas of auterfois acquit or convict
is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of Eng-
land that na man is to be brought in jeopardy of his life
more than once for the same offense. B1. Comm.535. I Many
dourts taking this vie and arguing that tnasrxch as all
cases af peril do not aIount to jeopardy in the sonso that
It can be pleaded a defense in the English law have construed
this provision to mean more than the plea of a former pro-
secutin did at the co=.on law. It has too been uniformly
held tthat this rovision ii 'z; Ui:-tod t Constitution
is only a limitation on tie c of tc,, United Ctates and
is not a restriction u!jon tl.... strt zor'ts; and accordingly
the same restrtittloi is foizncd in t o . ons-tituti-I of nearly
every state.
Frou this wo :!rixt'proaeed to a discusrion of tne cases
which have adjtdicated the tLeanire of this jrovision in the
State and United States courtz.
MIITIAL EL M TS OF JEOPAMUY.
A -ierson is in jeo-Irdy when he is put upon trial before
a court of competent -jurisdiction, npon indictment "or infor-
mation which is sufficient in form and smfbstanco to sustain a
conviction, and a ury has been charged rith his deliverance.
17 Wendell 33G; Co=. v Clark, C S. & R. (pa.) 1533; Co~iey
Cdnst. Lim. 399.
A court is of cozetent jurisdiiction Tihich has juris-
diction of the particular offense ,.hich oJ ffnse -ras comittod
within the territorial liaaits and is 3xercised '.it'in its
terms as regulated by lar.
Where an act conztituto; a cririq agai:stj tY-.o sovtjreigzi-
ities- an the State and United States Eovorrxnent- there'may
be a concurrent right to proceed ag.ainzt the offender in Cthe
conris of the so:,rrta juri'2iction eo that 7.1hichever of the
two goverrm:-ents cquires jiurisdiction of him shal bo entitled
to proceed "'ad finon lit'is" rithcut interfoerccu from the
other. U.I. v 1arhhart, 22 red. 235. !,.,at co-irts of differ-
ant soveroienitior c...... vo -.. urr.. ii ind'ction of the
sme offense imlens it is oni arising , sne law, common to
then all as the law of nations. U.S. v Piratses, 5 Thoat. 197.
And a tril in one of thevi for such F chrxure is conksidered as
a bar therefore in another. But a !ersoi, zay cor.itt two
crimes by doing'or omitting one act against Itwo governments
or sovereigns which can bc;ed upon in tro ri-arate tri-
bunals and the trial in one is no bar to a prosecution in the
other. This is the case fhon a person eo:Jitts a crime which
is an infraction of the laws of t"qio Stata and also of the
United States.
.qTich offense was corix-tted within th torritorial limits
of its jurisdiction- inar:zT.ch Fs the territorial inits of
the Jurisdiction of no-arly all the courts are sharply defined
there is little difficulty in dotern ining in cost oases
whether an a t fall itin a certain, j11risdiction. But an
interesting case an this. as is U. v 3cnhart, 22 ed.28 .
Here a white man in a quarrel shot and killed an Indian on the
Vatilla Reservation in Oreon. he was trir'T in the courts
of the state a.d acquittod. I.o a& Agn brovi'ctt to trial
for the same offense in the Unitos 3tates District Court. The
defendant pleadecd forvir joo._ yr . Itlio oout said that in
that tho duty has rlevolvold upon tw LAtional oowrnunt to
swpervise and control the intereonr;3oi betwonia the Indians
and its,citizens so that as far a os:i'J each may be pro-
tected from wrong and injury by the other it could not be re-
strained-and limited by the fact that the Indians are within
the limits of the state and the Vlea of former Jeopardy was
held not well taken.
The prosecut ion rust be on an indictment or information
sufficient in form end z-Lfztance to sustain a conviction- if
the indictment It fould by an illogally Crganized grand jury
it Is held not suxffL-cient. hlheimer v State, 39 1 iss. 548.
A conviction on a defective indictmient is no bar unless
Judgment has been taken and an execution issued thereon.Earj v
State, 26 S.W.714. But it eilears tit Iartial endurance of
punishment Infleicted on a defective indictnant will be no
bar if the judgment is reversed on the defendant's own iaotion.
Wharton Grim. 'r. & P. See. 457,507 Quitc a subtle argu-
ment in favor of thie -lea of forner jeoparely is nade sonetimes
if prosecnition is had on an insufficient indictment on the
groind that defendant is mxbj;cted to the sae -LuAsbment but
this doctrine does not prevail with the colrts. An erron-
eous acquittal of ti, defendant on a good indictment even
without the J-dr-,,iont of the coart th;reon is.a bar to a
second prosecution. Whorton PI. t- Pr. 43C And where an in-
dictment has been dismissed for variance it was held there
was no jeopardy. If at any time before the final Judgment
the prosecuting officer discovers any defect in the indict-
ment he mayenter a nal.pros. and have the defendant indicted
anew. 13ish. Crim. Law. 1021.
Without examining any more authorities we feel safe in
saying that aLything that is vitally defective in the form or
substance of an indictment and which wou]4 not support a
judgment against the defendant can be taken advantage of at
al time before final jud&-icnt and execution end cannot be
pleaded as a defense to a subsequentrial
And a Jury has bean charged with his deliverance- this is
the last requisite to a legal jeopardy. "Men they have been
so charged the defendant is entitled to a verdict which will
forever be a bar to another irasecution. CoOley Const..Lim.399
This is the important point in the I:rocoutciig to dutor-
mine; for until it has reao'hed this stage there is no claim
that there has ever been P jeopardy;*nd a trial without a
jury is a nullity. A Jury conristz of twelve LIeM and any
mistake as to this niuor .ill render a trial null and vaid.
People v Barker, 33 Y. 277. It is also implied in the
term Jluy that it shall be C body of -conpetent ten and if
after the jury are sworn, one of the iu in is found to be
incompetent either because he is prejudiced, biased or Il-
legally chosen he may be discharged and a new Jury selected.
66 Mich. 277; 1C Nev. 110. A Cury nay also be dischar&d
for cause at any time before the idiatment is read without
entitling defendant to discharge as having been once in aeop-
ardy, though his pveinptory challenges have beer. oxhausted.
State v Nash, i4 S.W. 007.
In State v Robinson, 43 La. 701, defendant was indicted
for larceny and-a jury was ii.%ahelled and sworn. At this
stage of the proceeding the district attorney requested tam-
'porary suspension of the trial to prepare an apilicatln for a
continuance inorder to enable him to prooure the testimony of
an absent witness. The appclioation was granted and the jury
discharged defendant ras P"ferwards found guilty and ujon an
an ap~eal'the court citing State v Hash, supra held that the
defendant had, once been in j ooardy and was discharged.
It is ra-ortant to determine what qualifications are
necessary to constitute a reao'na6ly exceptional juror in a
criminal case. In RBie v State, 7 Ind. 336, the court said,
'*1e must have honesty, capiacity, independence and freedom
from prejudice and fror. any opinion folUded upon the partiO-
ular evidence produced in the oase.'"
In Peopalev T3akcr, 60 . 277, the court, *A disqual-
ification does not arise because it will require some evidence
to remove iryrpessionh or opinions founded from rumors, news-
paper statements or from whatever source theso inia ressios
may have been re~aeived." The authorities which we have ex-
amined only a few of .ich have been cited support the follow-
Ing proposition.
When the jury is corpleted have boon duly enjanelled and
sworn and added to tho other branches of t'lo court the indict-
ment read and all the proliminary steps taken the defendant
Is in jeopardy and the jnry are charred with his deliverance.
Our inquiry has been so far to determine what are the
requisite elements which must arpj:jar in the coitrse of, any,
prosecution to warrant us in saying definitely that the defen-
dant has once been in Jeopardy mnl is therefore froo from
further prosecution and to -,oint out if pos.-ible) some of the
cafst by which we are to *e cui Ic in coriAng to this Corclus-
ion.
We mist rerelrber that when jeopardy has once attached
if it be only for a oa3:.ont, it i3 in 'i-e eye of t?.e law just
as effective a defense and just as intrmoimtable a barrier
to a second prosecution as thouCgh it had continued through a
Ing and aggravating trial. But although the law is thus
rigorous, in guarding the defendant frow a second jeolardy,
we will see that circumstances may arise subsequently which
will render this defense wholly ineffective an a plea in a
second prosecution. COr next step therefore isto consider
rcizstances arising subsequent to the attachment of jeop-
ardy by whl j tte 1'pYlicatlon of ti e ola ± farmer Jeopardy
is entirely abrogated and we rill do this under the head of-
IE! CTUAi OR SIAL' RIALS
Right here it will be proper to allude to a former refer-
ence we made to a distinction between the -lea of auterfois
acquit or convict, as they are uxderstood in the English law
and the plea of former Aeolrdy as it is construed by some of
our courts. The courts soeeu to reason th.at inasmuch as there
to suTi~ort either of, t'ere la,
must tave been a verdict df the jury Rt he ,o.:o-a in
A
the United States Cornstitutior aOainst a second ;eolardy is
rinch broader than the do c:- u ':. th:roforo AgCi.h cis-
ions on this point are r-ot precedonts which Ameri-an co-urts
are bound to follow. >ut a further divertance of oiinion is
found in the decisions of t;4 United States and State courts
and their construction of this provision.
Mr. Whorton in his Criminal Law Sac. 574 in considering
the latitude which covtrts have allowed in the discharge of
juries during the progress of the trial 'places the cases into
two general classes.
First,- Mere any separation of the jury except in cases
of sceh violent necessity as may be considered the act of God
is held a bar to all subsequent iroceedings.
Second,- Where it is held that the discharge of a Jury
is a ratter of sound discreticn for the court and that when
in the exercise of a soimd discretion it talzes plaoe, it pre-
sents no iiapedlient to a second trial.
The first view -e s been taken by the courts of Pa., Va.,
N,C.,Te)m.,, Ind., and Ala.
The second view r'as taken by the United States courts and
follued by the coirts of Yew York, Ill.., iass., Ly., and
M{iss.
An early case decido- in th, United States co1irts on
this point was that of U.S. v Porez, 9 Wheat. 579. Iere the
defendant had been put cn trial for a capital offense and the
Jury after deliber;ti.g for a tir-c Fr.'~d beir u +,a cl to agree
were dischargo. J Sde tory tn 1aus o-i-Aic :a:aeos 'tL.o fol-
lowing ntatement, "Ife are of teo opinion taat the facts con-
stitute no legal bar to a future trial. The prisoner has not
been convicted or acquitted and u.y again bu put upon his de-
fense. 771 thir: that in all cases of this nature the law
has investedl courts of justice with authority to'disoharge a
Jury from giving any verdict, whenever in their opinion taking
all the circuoxU;-tances into conxideration, there is a manifest
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated."
In a later case in the same court the sane dootrime was
again enunciated by the zsare judge, and after an exhaustive
examination of the Enlish authorities, he draws the follow-
Ing conclusion. "T.huIs wo see that the tn.axir ic ent0edded in
the very elements of teo coui.on law; and has been uniformly
cyonstrued to Prevent an inlsrmourtable barrier to a second
prosecution, when there has been once a verdict of convication
or acquittal regularly had xpon a suffa.toient indictment."
* These are plainly re Uroat -iion-er decisions on the
eonstitutional intor-,retation of this provis'ion and they not
only settle the law in the United Itates courts but exercise
a profound influence over the state coinrts in adolting the
same construction as well. It is !-lain that Judge Story
regarded the provision in 5th Amendment of the Constitution
as an incorporation of the co an law, riaxim and construed it
in the light of the interpretation it had received at common
law.
In t)e construction put upon this provision by tbei first
line of cases, the courts have argued that twice laut in Jeop-
ardy and twice put upon trial convey to the mind several dis-
tinct meanings: that the Constitution forbids a second Jeop-
ardywhich arises as soon as the !JUri ii 'charged with the
deliverance of the Irisoner. They consider Jeopardy in its
etymological sense as a bar, and deny any right to inquire
further except in cases of the mast overruling necessity.
Corn v Clark, 6 S. & R. 577: Willims v Cam., 2 Grat. 5G8;
State v :1res, hayes 241; State v Waterhouse, 8 Yerger
(Tem.) 278: Ned v Steto, 7 Porter 188.
Whorton thinks these two conflicting opinions can be re-
oneiled If It be conceded that the discretion which a oourt
is Termitted to exercise be a legal necoeitY nch as would
If spread upon the record ana!io a court of record to say
that the discharge was correct. -But of these two views the
one which gives to the court a wider discretion in discharging
the Jury is plainly and rightly gallng support in the courts
of the United States.
In 7 Ala. 250 ,where the court had dliscsed of its bus-
iness and the Jury were still deliberating on their verdict
In a criminal prosecution for a capital offense It was held,
that the court had authority to discharge the Jury after a
reasonable length.,of time.
In 1:orgex v State, 13 Ind. 215, the jury had been 1*pt
In custody beyond tbe, regular term of comrt. The verdict
was received and entered on Tuesday after the exviraticn of
the tem. It was held that this uTas an error and there was
a Ia'pse and the defendant was entitled to an aoquital.
It has also been held where the defendant was required
to be in court when the Jury retukrned with a verdict but
failed to be p;resent that the court could declato a mistrial
and the defe4dant again *'e -ut upon his defense,
The death of a judge or a juor is a uxiversal ground
for the discharge of the Jury. Wharton Crim. Law. Sec. 598.
Inasmich as the cases which we have exnaiincd serve to
indicate the direction in which tbe& courts are travelling and
it is evident that they are tending towards granting greater
discretion to the courts, it will p,;rhap.s be pro,er to close
this part of our subject with a discussion of some recent
decisions which are in line with this tendency.
In State v Lee, 30 Atl. I0, this tendency was ably
pointed out by Judge Iennsy as follows, "Judicious legis-
latian for securing a full, fair, legal trial of each crim-
Inal cause is not in derogation but in protection of individ-
ueal rights and is in full accord ith the principle that no
man shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Put-
ting in jeopardy raeans a jeopardy which is real and h~s con-
tinued through every stagq jqf qne -' osecUtion as fixed by
existing laws relating to lrocedure.'1 In this case an ap-
peal was allowed by the state on the ground that the court
had refused to adfmit some expert evidence into the case which
went to prove a question which was raised as to whether or
not a certain wound was self inflicted.
In Stocks v State, 01 Ga. 831, it was held ,roer for
the court to inform a Juror of the death of his mother and
discharge the jury. The caurt said, "That which unfits a
Juror for the performance of hiis duty oroates a legal necessity
and such unfitness mpy result from wental sufferinc no less
than from physical e in. As civilization and refinement
have progressed there has been a growing disposition on the
parts of courts to recognize the influence of the feelings
and emotions on the mind as producing this necessity.
In Hawes v State, 0 Ala., the sicness of a juror's
wife shown by the testimony of the attending physician to be
such that her safely, comfort and life depended upon the
presence and attendance of her husband was held to be such a
necessity as would authorire the discharge of the jury.
State v Tatman, 59 Iowa 471 presents a case of legal
necessity where the judEe after all the evidence had been
taken, was inforined by telegrau of the illness of his wife,
and the jury was held to be lawfully discharged.
In State v Davis, 31 W. Va. 300 after the greater part
of the evidence had been taken information was iiwawrted to a
Juror of the death of his son, it was held that a necessity
for the discharge of the jury existed.
In Sin ans v U.S.,142 U.S. 148 an affidavit ws made by
the district attorney to the court stating that a juror on
trial had sworn falsely in denying that he had -ev knuh
or had any dealing with the defendant and the jury on his re-
quest was discharged. In hiu- o-pinion Judge Gray says, 'It
needs no argum ent to provo that the judge tu ion re.celving such
infor.iation, was fully justifiel in concluding that such a
collusion under the :feculiar %iroiu.tances attending it made
it irtossiloe for tua- jury in considering thc case, to act
with the independence and freedom on the part of each juror
required to a fair trial of the issue betweon the parties.
There can be no condition of things in which the necessity
for the ateroise of this power is :ore mranifest, in order to
prevent the defeat of the ends of public justice, than when
it is made to ap.ear to the court that either by reason of
facts existing when the jurors were sworn, but not then dis-
elored or :nowr, to the o rt ,or by r a on of outside influence
brought to boar on the jury ponding the trial, the jurors or
any of then are subject to suo-h bias or prejedice as not to
stand Impartial between the government and the accused."
We think that any further examination of causos is super-
fluous and unnecessary. It would indeed be impossible to
enumerate all the circiz.-.tances which could arise in which
the court would be called up.on to exercise its discretion in
discharging a jury in the course of a trial. In conclusion
we can lay down one proposition or rule which is deducible
from all the cases; and that is, the court 1.ay discharge a
jury whenever a noceeL:ity for so doing shall arise but the
various circastan-rs .vvler which such a necessity exists is
not reducible to any rule. An examination of the recent
decisions has shown however, that the 1odern tendency is to-
wards extending the rule that"no man shall be twice put in
JepPardytto mean the sound judicial discretion of the court,
in determining in the acurse of a trial when an emergency a-
rises which will justify the dischar~e of the jury.
Inasmuch.as tie %lea of former Jeopardy is classed among
the favorable pleas and As wholly for the defendant's own
benefit and protection we will see that he may waive this
defense the same as he cold the statute of li:mitationsj
passed for his benefit or as an infant could waivexa statute'
on reaching maturity which nade his contract voidable at his
option.
The most usual case in which the defendant waives this
privilege is when he takes an appeal from a judgment which
ha4 been p4noun ced against 'iim. This ..ay take the form of
a direct appeal to be heard in an ai:ellate court or a motion
for a new trial, or to arrest or set aside a verdict of the
Jury. There the dofoncrant a:peals Jirou a judm:nt and pro-
Mcres a reversal ani a n trial is ()r(erad t jidgent and
eversal in such a case mumt be assuued to be set aside at
the instance of tho defendatt, upon the theory that upon
prouring the reversal or affirmance of the Judgent he im-
pliedly consents to all the consequences legitimately follow-
tng sich reversal or affirmanoe. Dishop's Crim. Law, 1004,1016
Ene. & Aza. Encye. of Law, Vol. 11. 130.
Defendant may also by consenting to the discarge of the
Jury waive his defense. This consent may be either express
or implied. If during the trial the jury is discharged with
defendant's concurrence, this i:plies a waiver of his right
and he may again be ut iron trial, v Stato,1 Hump. 102;
2 Grat. 507.
The defendaxt also can V'y his conduct raive his defense
as where he absents hi. .-elf from court, when the verdict is
rendered when he is required by la to be present. State v
Battle, 7 Ala. 259
We Das now to consider the last head into which our
subject is dividd.
W6MN TN1' DEII Ojr Pogigm~ JEp-
AML AN BE SUCCEASS~FULLY FLADZ .
17e me t state at the outset that this Tilea is only avail-
able when the erime oharg~od is precisely ard identically the
same one for which teo r7ofndmat .-as caiargod in t-,e first.
We nust however observe an essential difference between
a second prosecution for te sane offenseand a second and
separate prosecution for different offenses coixtted 1?y the
same act. To illtstrate; the dual relation of the citizen
to the United States and State governments implies an obed-
ience to the laws of each. 'low we can easily understand
that an act might bo an infraction of a state 9oiand of a
United States statute as well- and it would be plainly destruot-
Ive of both if one could inflict a punisbxert for its commiss-
ion which would be an in-zxnity from any prosecution by the
other. It would be a ruinous inovation by one government
on the legislative and judicial functions of the other. By
an analogy of reasoni: i this same doctrine aDilies to the
relation subsisting betwon mmieipal and state governments.
In Ex Farte hong Shan, 013 Cal. 31, an ordinance of the
city regulated the sale of opiim, and provided for a punish-
ment for a violation of the smne which was not inconsistent
with the Eeneral 1a':) f th. state. DeftP,, a,'.t ras rosOcuted
=nder the city ord1::anc a-id on :rosecuition by the state sub-
sequently for the same act the court held that it did not
constitute a violaticn of tho constitutional inhibition against
putting one in jeo-pardy twrioe for the same offense.
In Theisen v l.c David, IG Z.F" (Fia.) 3!, a statute which
prohibited the sale of certain articles on Sundayj except in
case of necessity~and ,,uade the same punishable as a misde-
meanor was held to be no constitutional bar to another pro-
secution by the state for the same act and punishable with
the same penalty.
Also in State v Reid, 20 S.E. 4CS, a prosecution by the
city for selling liquor las held no bar to a subsequent pro-
secut ion under the state law for the same offense.
These few cases are sufficient to illustrate the well
settled rule that an act or om!ririon which irnfracts two or
more statutes at the sae time may bo visited by successive
punishments by tne courts .- iwich have jurisdiction of each
without raisi.g ar...y cc,,_tbtionalobjecticn.
Another case in which the question whether a man has
been once in jeo:.ardy arises is where a j'idgment has been had
convicting him of so,.e other orie than that which was named
in the indictror.t. it is quito erll sottied that a Jury
cannot convict a fsoner r a hiegi( triic tlian is charged
In the indict,-r.t; b'tt it can convict him of a:Iy lower crime
which is inclued r ithin the tertis of the indictnlent. Thus,
If the defendant is charged with mixrder the crie of man-
slaugter is necessarily included in the charge. 4 St.Rep.117.
In People v L'c Gowan, 17 Wend. 366, the defendant had
been tried and acquaitted of robberyj and again he was indicted
on substantially the sane charges for larceny. The court
held that the indictment for robbery involved the question of
simple larceny, of which the prisoner Wrder the indictment
might have been convicted; and therefore the plea of former
jeopardy was valid. The test niade by the court was in these
words, *To entitle the defendant to a verdict it m s necessary
that the evidence to su!xjort the last indictent would have
been sufficient to support the first indictment.
But it will be necessary to bear in mind that there is a
difference between a conviction of an offense of a lower
grade than that named in the indictment, ard a conviction of
the smae crime in alowor degree than the indictment charges.
An illustration of this principle is the People v Keffer,
65 Cal. 232. The defendant Tas charged in the indictment
for rr!lmder, and ras found guilty of Ttrn1,'r in tle second
degree. The court held that he could again be put on trial
for murder in the first degroe. The distinction rade in the
two cases seems to be that in the fornier the defendant is IM-
pI.,-dly acquitted 3f all higher offenses charged in the in-
dictment by his conviction for the lower;and when the defendant
moves for a new trial he Povos only for a new trial of the
issue which has be.,n found against him. In the latter case)
the distinction made between different degrees of the same
crime is looked upon :Orely as a legislative classification
by which the jury are to deterine the character of the crime)
and as a guide by which they may approximate t1e 1eqiuisit6
penalty.
In conclvding this discussion it is enough to say that
the doctrine of our law so finrrly ostablishel. 1or that "no
man shall be twice jut in jeop'ardy for the smame offense" is
fundamental as a principle of.justioe and to the finality of
Irgislation. It had its origin in the early co-on law, and
was first enunciat#ed by T-rd lo:o , one of England's greatest
Judges. It was a non-judiclal expression of Mhat he thought
to be a civil right, and although it has been criticised as
harsh and inflexible it has been a bafrier to a second -pro-
secution for te stae offense at every stage of the English
low, and is nLol rcognize1d in overy systm2 ff JurisPrudense
in the civiliredo wor!,. It ras incororatod into the Con-
stitution of the U'nibed states anrd it has foumd its wal in
substantial terms into the constitution of nearly every state
in the Union. The -L"yLeldingt rigor with which It was first
adnnistered was suitable to the, ago in which It was adopted;
but in riodern tins it has bouv relaxed to meet the more
tolerable and hmaane conitions of civilization and whether a
man can or cannot now be tried thLe second time for the same
offense, will be answored by detertf.ning whether or not lt
would result in the miscarriage of justice, without reference
to the technicalities of j;dicial procedure.
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